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Abstract
Research summary: The dominant view has been that businesses that are more related to each other are more
often combined within diversified firms. This study uses a dynamic model to demonstrate that, with inter-
temporal economies of scope, diversified firms are more likely to combine moderately related businesses than
the most-related businesses. That effect occurs because strong relatedness reduces redeployment costs and
makes firms redeploy all resources to better performing businesses. The strength of that effect depends on
inducements for redeployment measured as the current return advantage of one business over another
business, volatilities of business returns, and correlation of those returns. This study develops hypotheses for
those relationships and suggests empirical operationalizations, encouraging empiricists to retest the
implications of relatedness for the dynamics of corporate diversification.
Managerial summary: It is believed that diversified firms are more likely to combine more-related businesses
because relatedness enables sharing of resources between businesses. Indeed, a firm can apply knowledge
created in one business to another business, avoiding costly duplication in knowledge development. Resource
sharing also adds value when a firm offers several products, adding the convenience of one-stop shopping and
charging higher prices. However, resource sharing is not the only motivation for corporate diversification. In
environments where profitability of businesses changes frequently, firms diversify by redeploying part of
resources from an underperforming business to a better performing business. This study uses a dynamic
model to demonstrate that, with that second motivation for corporate diversification, firms end up combining
moderately related businesses rather than the most-related businesses.
Keywords
corporate diversification, resource–based view, resource relatedness, economies of scope, dynamic choice
model.
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ECONOMIES OF SCOPE, RESOURCE RELATEDNESS, AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
ABSTRACT 
The idea that relatedness between businesses enhances the tendency for diversifying firms to 
persistently combine those businesses dominated corporate diversification research. This study 
uses a dynamic model to qualify that proposition. The model considers alternative types of 
economies of scope and demonstrates that, with inter–temporal economies from redeployment of 
tangible resources, the effect of relatedness on diversification is very distinct from the assumed 
relationship. In particular, moderate rather than the strongest relatedness involved in inter–
temporal economies creates the strongest diversification propensity. Moreover, the effect of 
relatedness on that propensity depends on other determinants of economies of scope. The study 
develops hypotheses for those complex relationships and suggests empirical operationalizations, 
encouraging empiricists to retest the implications of relatedness for the dynamics of corporate 
diversification. 
 
Keywords: corporate diversification; resource–based view; resource relatedness; economies of 
scope; dynamic choice model.
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ECONOMIES OF SCOPE, RESOURCE RELATEDNESS, AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
INTRODUCTION 
A key rationale for corporate diversification is that firms aim for economies of scope (Panzar and 
Willig, 1981; Teece, 1980).
1
 From the resource–based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959), such 
economies represent a reduction in costs for a firm deploying its resources in multiple businesses 
relative to the costs those businesses would incur if managed as independent firms.
2
 The 
resource–based economies were linked to resource relatedness, the similarity of resource 
requirements between businesses (Rumelt, 1974). Relatedness supports economies by enhancing 
the applicability of resources across the combined businesses and enabling the frugal use of the 
same resources (e.g., plants, employees, and technological and marketing knowledge) across 
those businesses (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). In line with that logic, many empirical studies 
have confirmed that diversifying firms are more likely to enter more–related businesses (Anand, 
2004; Chang, 1996; Neffke and Henning, 2013; Silverman, 1999; Wu, 2013; Zhou, 2011). 
Despite the compelling empirical support to the idea that firms initiate diversification by 
entering related businesses, the evidence on the implications of relatedness for the resulting 
dynamics of corporate diversification has been decidedly mixed.
3
 On one hand, relatedness was 
argued to preserve combinations of businesses in the corporate scope (Bryce and Winter, 2009; 
Teece et al., 1994; Lien and Klein, 2013). That view was supported in studies verifying that 
firms are more likely to combine more–related businesses (Breschi, Lissoni, and Malerba, 2003; 
Fan and Lang, 2000; Lemelin, 1982). Moreover, relatedness of an entered business to other
                                                        
1 While focusing on economies of scope as a motive for diversification, this study only briefly discusses risk–reduction by firms 
(Amit and Livnat, 1988; Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990) and does not explicitly consider agency issues (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
2 While recognizing the importance of demand–side economies of scope (Ye, Priem, and Alshwer, 2012) realized through the 
increased consumer willingness to pay for two products bundled by the same firm, the present study focuses on economies linked 
to the resource side of corporate diversification. Recent reviews of the research embracing the resource–based view on corporate 
diversification can be found in Hauschild and zu Knyphausen–Aufseß (2013) and Wan et al. (2001). 
3 Like in Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004), the dynamics of corporate diversification refer to the evolution of the corporate scope. 
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businesses in the firm scope was shown to reduce the chances of subsequently exiting the entered 
business (Chang, 1996; Lien and Klein, 2013; O’Brien and Folta, 2009). On the other hand, 
relatedness of the combined businesses can destabilize the corporate scope. As Helfat and 
Eisenhardt (2004) argued, relatedness enables a firm to exit one business and enter another 
business, making the firm focused rather than diversified. Lee, Folta, and Lieberman (2010) were 
first to illustrate that relatedness of an entered business to a firm’s other businesses raises the 
likelihood that the firm will exit the entered business. The opposing empirical findings 
introduced the ambiguity about the ultimate effect of relatedness on the probability that a firm 
will diversify into a pair of businesses. Besides the ambiguity about the ultimate effect of 
relatedness on the probability of diversification, two other issues listed in the first column of 
Table 1 were unresolved. Notably, the issues of whether relatedness alone suffices to predict the 
probability of diversification and how that probability evolves over time were not clear. The lack 
of clear answers to the three questions in the first column of Table 1 resulted from three 
respective limitations in previous research mentioned in the second column of the same table. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The first flaw was that, except for Lee et al. (2010), the previous views did not carefully 
discriminate the effects of relatedness on diversification between distinct types of economies of 
scope. That approach contrasted with Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) who clarified that ‘inter–
temporal’ economies are very different from the often–studied ‘intra–temporal’ economies. 
While intra–temporal economies occur when a diversified firm contemporaneously shares its 
resources between related businesses, inter–temporal economies are realized when a firm exits 
one business and enters another related business by redeploying resources between them.
4
 The 
                                                        
4 Although this study focuses on redeployment of resources between a firm’s businesses, it does not explicitly consider resource 
redeployments between the acquirer and the target following a corporate acquisition (Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998). 
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restrictive focus on economies from the contemporaneous sharing of resources between related 
businesses led to the prevalent belief that relatedness between two businesses should enhance the 
probability that a firm will diversify into them (Bryce and Winter, 2009; Teece et al., 1994), 
inspiring multiple empirical tests (Breschi et al., 2003; Fan and Lang, 2000; Lemelin, 1982). 
The second shortcoming was that the extant accounts implicitly assumed that the effect of 
relatedness on the patterns of corporate diversification was independent of other determinants of 
economies of scope. However, as Penrose (1959) argued, economies created in corporate 
diversification depend on the interaction of relatedness (reducing the costs of redeploying 
resources between businesses) with ‘inducements,’ the return advantages of one business over 
another. Such advantages represent an opportunity cost of the continued use of resources in a 
business performing worse than an alternative business. Sakhartov and Folta (2015) formally 
demonstrated that inducements moderate the effect of relatedness on economies of scope. As 
long as economies of scope determine corporate diversification decisions, inducements are also 
very likely to modify the effect of relatedness on the propensity of a firm to diversify. 
The third limitation in the existing research was that the theory about how relatedness 
affects the dynamics of corporate diversification was largely informal. Nevertheless, verbal 
arguments can be ‘very misleading’ in the complex settings with inter–temporal links between a 
firm’s choices (Ghemawat and Cassiman, 2007: 530). In the context of corporate diversification, 
such links are present between corporate scope decisions because resource redeployments are 
costly to reverse. As a result, a firm deciding to enter (or exit) a business considers not only the 
current redeployment costs but also the costs of a possible future exit from (or re–entry into) that 
business, making corporate diversification path–dependent (Sakhartov and Folta, 2014). The 
informal reasoning in that complex context included the tenuous assumption that, in contrast to 
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relatedness linked to the sharing of resources, relatedness linked to resource redeployment may 
only have short–run implications for corporate diversification patterns (Bryce and Winter, 2009). 
Considering the three limitations mentioned above, the current study collects the 
determinants of different types of economies of scope from the existing literature and develops a 
dynamic model of corporate diversification. Rooted in the general principle of dynamic 
optimality (Bellman, 1957), the model exploits the structural similarity of the allocation of 
resources across a set of businesses by firms to the allocation of wealth across a portfolio of 
securities by individual investors (Merton, 1969).
5
 The similarity enables the use of the 
simulation–based portfolio selection technique of Brandt et al. (2005) resolving not only the 
challenges of the informal reasoning in the complex corporate context but also the analytical 
intractability of diversification choices in the path–dependent setting (Haugh and Kogan, 2007). 
The model derives several novel insights into the dynamics of corporate diversification 
listed in the last column of Table 1. First, the model identifies how the effect of relatedness on 
the probability of diversification depends on the type of economies of scope. With intra–
temporal economies, the diversification propensity is enhanced by relatedness. In contrast, with 
inter–temporal economies, the diversification propensity has an inverted U–shape relationship 
with relatedness: firms are most likely to persist with combinations of businesses having 
intermediate rather than the highest levels of relatedness. Moreover, the effects relatedness has 
on corporate scope with the two types of economies turn out to be interdependent. In particular, 
the relationship between relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies and the probability of 
diversification is most–concave with moderate levels of relatedness involved in intra–temporal 
                                                        
5 Matsusaka (2001) applied the principle of dynamic optimality to corporate diversification, also highlighting the need to 
structure verbal arguments in the resource–based view using the principle of dynamic optimality (Matsusaka, 2001: 428). Other 
examples of elaborating the resource–based view on corporate diversification using the dynamic optimality are Bernardo and 
Chowdhry (2002), Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), Sakhartov and Folta (2014; 2015), and Triantis and Hodder (1990). 
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economies. Alternatively, the probability of diversification is unaffected by relatedness present 
in inter–temporal economies of scope when relatedness involved in intra–temporal economies is 
very low or very high. Second, the model indicates that inducements critically moderate the 
effect of relatedness on the diversification propensity. Finally, relatedness involved in inter–
temporal economies is shown to have very strong long–run implications for diversification. With 
moderate levels of relatedness present in inter–temporal economies, the probability of 
diversification grows over time and then keeps very high until the end of the resources’ lifecycle. 
The delivered results make three important contributions to corporate diversification 
research. First, the revealed difference in the effect of relatedness on diversification between 
intra–temporal and inter–temporal economies motivates researchers to unmerge those effects in 
empirical operationalizations and re–examine the often–tested relationship between relatedness 
and diversification. The later section of the paper provides some guidance on how to separately 
operationalize the two effects of relatedness. Second, the study is first to rigorously derive the 
complex relation between the diversification propensity and relatedness. The curvilinear relation 
involved in inter–temporal economies reconciles the findings that relatedness induces both the 
entry into and the exit from a business. The result also replaces the informal argument that firms 
are more likely to persist with sets of more–related businesses. Besides qualifying the often–
tested hypothesis, the result reveals limitations of the recently advocated operationalization of 
relatedness based on the survival of business combinations (Bryce and Winter, 2009; Lien and 
Klein, 2013; Teece et al., 1994). When moderately–related businesses are more likely to be 
combined than strongly related businesses, inferring stronger relatedness from the co–occurrence 
of businesses in the corporate scope is tenuous. Third, the insight that inducements moderate the 
effect of relatedness on the diversification propensity necessitates the use of the interactions in 
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empirical models predicting the probability and the direction of corporate diversification. This 
paper develops a set of hypotheses enabling the identification of the interactions between the 
previously–known determinants of economies of scope reviewed immediately below. 
DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIES OF SCOPE 
Two recent elaborations enable a better identification of determinants of economies of scope. 
First, Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) explained that, in addition to the often–cited ‘intra–temporal’ 
economies, firms use ‘inter–temporal’ economies. While intra–temporal economies occur when a 
firm contemporaneously shares resources between its businesses, inter–temporal economies are 
enacted when a firm withdraws all or part of its resources from one business (fully or partially 
exiting that business) and redeploys them to another business. Second, Levinthal and Wu (2010) 
clarified that intra–temporal economies involve ‘scale free’ intangible resources with no physical 
substance (e.g., technological and marketing knowledge). Such resources can be leveraged to 
new uses without withdrawing them from the original use. Conversely, inter–temporal 
economies involve ‘non–scale free’ tangible resources having constraints on their physical 
capacity (e.g., employees and manufacturing plants) and demanding the withdrawal from the 
original use to be redeployed to another use. Because firms’ businesses comprise bundles of 
various resources (Penrose, 1959), diversification usually involves both types of economies. 
With both economies, relatedness, defined by Rumelt (1974) as the similarity of resource 
requirements between businesses, was identified as the key determinant (Hill et al., 1992). 
Relatedness and intra–temporal economies of scope 
With intra–temporal economies of scope, relatedness between businesses in the corporate scope 
promotes the applicability of the scale free knowledge across them (Bryce and Winter, 2009). 
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Accordingly, a diversified firm can apply knowledge created in one business to another business, 
thereby avoiding the costly duplication in the development of the knowledge required in the two 
related businesses (Porter, 1987; Teece, 1980). While the applicability of knowledge across 
businesses hinges upon relatedness between them, there is no reason to assume that any level of 
relatedness results in positive economies. Because the knowledge transfer to receiving business 
units is costly (Maritan and Brush, 2003), such transfer costs can exceed small cost savings in 
unrelated diversification turning economies into diseconomies of scope. Conversely, in related 
diversification, the costs of the knowledge transfer are likely to fall behind strong economies. 
Relatedness and inter–temporal economies of scope 
With inter–temporal economies, relatedness promotes the applicability of non–scale free 
resources across the original and the new businesses. That enhanced cross–applicability leads to 
the following two effects. On one hand, relatedness reduces the current costs of redeploying 
non–scale free resources to the new business incurred in entering that business (Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988). On the other hand, relatedness enhances the reversibility of redeployment (or 
non‒redeployment) by reducing the costs of a possible future reversal of that decision incurred in 
exiting the entered business (or entering that business later) (Sakhartov and Folta, 2015). 
In addition to redeployment costs, economies realized in resource redeployment depend 
on ‘inducements,’ return advantages of one business over another (Penrose, 1959). Such 
advantages represent the opportunity cost of the continued deployment of a firm’s resources in 
the original use underperforming the alternative business. Sakhartov and Folta (2015) summarize 
three dimensions of inducements used in the existing research. The first dimension, enhancing 
economies of scope, is the current return advantages in the new business (Anand, 2004; 
Silverman, 1999; Wu, 2013). The second dimension, raising the economies, is return volatilities 
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(Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Triantis and Hodder, 1990) in the current and the new businesses. 
Finally, economies of scope are reduced by return correlation between the current and the 
alternative businesses (Triantis and Hodder, 1990). The three dimensions capture the relative 
attractiveness of the alternative business for current or future resource redeployment. Sakhartov 
and Folta (2015) derived that the effect of relatedness on inter–temporal economies is strongly 
moderated by inducements and cannot be identified without accounting for such interactions. 
Implications of relatedness for corporate scope 
Based on the suggested impacts of relatedness on the value created in corporate diversification, 
multiple exploratory studies assessed the relation between relatedness of a pair of businesses and 
the probability that a firm will diversify into that pair. For instance, Lemelin (1982) examined 
diversification patterns of more than 2,000 Canadian firms in early 1970s. The study found that 
the probability of diversification in a pair of businesses is positively associated with relatedness 
measured as the similarity of distribution systems in those businesses based on input–output 
tables. Fan and Lang (2000) studied the probability of diversification into a pair of businesses 
from nearly 500 U.S. industries in years 1982, 1987, and 1992. They reported that diversifying 
firms are more likely to own more–related segments, with relatedness captured as the affiliation 
with the same two–digit U.S. Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. That result was 
robustly confirmed in the same study with relatedness measured as the similarity in both inputs 
and outputs between the segment industries based on input–output tables. Finally, Breschi et al. 
(2003) explored the patterns of technological diversification in a large sample of firms in Europe 
and the U.S. in years between 1982 and 1993. That study demonstrated that a firm active in one 
technological field is more likely to participate in another field when the two fields are more–
related, with relatedness measured as co–occurrence of the two technological fields in patents. 
Economies of Scope, Resource Relatedness, and the Dynamics of Corporate Diversification 
11 
Despite some empirical evidence on the impact of relatedness on diversification patterns, 
the tests providing that evidence were based on the underdeveloped theory. In particular, the 
theory built off the assumption that the positive effect of relatedness on economies of scope 
translates into an unconditional positive effect of relatedness on the corporate scope. Notably, 
Teece et al. (1994: 5) ‘assume that activities which are more related will be more frequently 
combined within the same corporation.’ Subsequent work further explicated that assumption: 
We assume that each industry a diversified firm includes in its portfolio will affect firm 
performance. We refer to the performance effects of these combinations as the 
relatedness… related industries are more frequently combined in firms than unrelated 
industries. (Lien and Klein, 2013: 1480) 
Bryce and Winter (2009: 1573) explained that the benefits of sharing scale free knowledge 
between related businesses (i.e., intra–temporal economies of scope) preserve corporate 
diversification into those businesses for a long time. In contrast, the benefits of redeploying non–
scale free resources between related businesses (i.e., inter–temporal economies of scope) were 
assumed to have, at most, short–run implications (Bryce and Winter 2009: 1573). 
To sum up, the existing theory about the impact of relatedness on the dynamics of 
corporate diversification, as well as the empirical tests relying on that theory, had three important 
features illustrated in the third column of Table 1. First, the existing theory assumed, rather than 
carefully derived, that the probability of diversification is strongly positively associated with 
relatedness. Second, the effect of relatedness between two businesses on the propensity of a firm 
to diversify into those businesses was implicitly assumed independent of other determinants of 
economies of scope (i.e., inducements). Finally, the implications of relatedness occurring with 
inter–temporal economies of scope were deemed unimportant in the long run. The next section 
builds the model that enables the development of the theory free of those tenuous assumptions. 
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DYNAMIC MODEL OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
To scrutinize the implications of relatedness for corporate diversification, this section builds a 
dynamic model. The approach, rooted in the principle of dynamic optimality (Bellman, 1957), 
was common to rationalize investors’ lifetime allocation of wealth across a portfolio of securities 
(Merton, 1969) and was extended to corporate diversification (Bernardo and Chowdhry, 2002; 
Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Matsusaka, 2001; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014; 2015; and Triantis 
and Hodder, 1990). Resembling an investor keeping all her wealth in a single security, the firm 
in the model is initially focused on one business deploying all its resources in product market .i  
As an investor can allocate her cash to another security, so can the firm use its resources in an 
alternative product market .j
6
 Specifically, scale free resources can be shared between i  and j . 
Non–scale free resources may be fully or partially withdrawn from i  and redeployed to j , or 
vice versa, at any time t  before the end of the resource lifecycle .Tt   Proportions itm  and 
itjt mm 1  of non–scale free resources used respectively in markets i  and j  at time t  
represent corporate diversification choices, with itm  serving as a single control variable.
7
 Like a 
sequence of investment decisions by an individual investor in the portfolio choice model, the 
chain 10}{


T
titm  of corporate diversification choices represents the policy function in this model. 
 The corporate context specified in the model involves the pertinent determinants of 
economies of scope. In particular, the model includes the three dimensions of inducements: the 
current return advantage, return volatilities, and return correlation. Relatedness is modeled using 
                                                        
6 Corporate diversification can unfold through a sequence of entries into more than one additional business, wherein firms may 
end up with a portfolio of less–related businesses even though each entry in the sequence was related. That intriguing scenario is 
not explicitly considered in the model. While exploring that possibility is interesting, adding more businesses to the current 
model would substantially extend the computation time and distract the focus from the specific gaps outlined in Table 1. The 
model follows prior research (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Triantis and Hodder, 1990) and focuses on one alternative business. 
7 There is no need to specify proportions of scale free resources since such resources are levered infinitely between the markets 
and cannot be used in isolation from non–scale free resources. 
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its two ramifications, the ease of sharing of scale free knowledge (present in intra–temporal 
economies of scope) and the costs of redeployment of non–scale free resources (present in inter–
temporal economies of scope). Redeployment costs make diversification choices path–dependent 
(i.e., payoff to future choices depend on current choices) and, hence, intractable not only 
qualitatively (Ghemawat and Cassiman, 2007) but also analytically (Haugh and Kogan, 2007). 
The structural similarity of the dynamic allocation of corporate resources to the dynamic 
portfolio choice model (Merton, 1969) and the generality of the principle of dynamic optimality 
(Bellman, 1957) enable the use of a numerical method originally developed to optimize the 
dynamic portfolio choices. In particular, the intractability is resolved with the simulation–based 
technique of Brandt et al. (2005) illustrated in van Binsbergen and Brandt (2007). 
To use the method of Brandt et al. (2005), the model represents returns itC  and jtC  in 
product markets i  and j  at time t  as two random state variables evolving in discrete time. The 
model simulates a large number of paths for itC  and jtC , with realizations kitC  and kjtC  on path 
k  at time t . Accordingly, proportions kitm  and kitkjt mm 1  capture a diversification choice on 
path k  at time t . The sequence 10}{


T
tkitm  of diversification choices on path k  is identified by 
using the dynamic programming approach (Bellman, 1957). Namely, starting with time 1Tt  
when a diversification choice can be made the last time before the end of the resource lifecycle, 
the model finds on each path proportion 
*
kitm  that maximizes a Taylor approximation of the value 
function, the utility of the value the firm accumulates over the lifecycle of its resources by 
allocating those resources between the two businesses. Like in van Binsbergen and Brandt 
(2007), the coefficients for the Taylor series are estimated by running the ordinary least square 
regression of the value function realized at Tt   on a polynomial of the state variables at time
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1Tt . The algorithm then proceeds recursively from 1Tt  to 0t . To apply the method 
of Brandt et al. (2005) to the present study, two extensions are introduced. First, because unlike 
Brandt et al. (2005) and van Binsbergen and Brandt (2007) the present study is not particularly 
interested in explicating the policy function, the diversification choices are summarized across 
all paths as the probability that the firm is diversified at time t . Second, the algorithm is 
replicated for multiple sets of the determinants of economies of scope to derive how the found 
probability of diversification is affected by those determinants. Key elements of the model, the 
corporate context and the identification of diversification choices, are elaborated below. 
Corporate context 
In the model, at every time t  the firm seeks to maximize the value function tU  of the terminal 
value TV  accumulated through resource deployment choices 
1}{ 
T
tsism  undertaken over the 
remaining lifecycle of the firm’s resources. Formally, the problem the firm faces is: 
)]([
}{
max
1
Tt
m
t VuEU
T
tsis


 ,   (1) 
In Equation 1, ][tE  is the expectation based on the information available at time t . The function 
)(u  captures the utility of the risk–averse firm from having value TV  given the risk attached to 
that value. The property of risk–aversion is common for individuals optimizing the allocation of 
wealth across risky securities. There are several reasons for extending that assumption to firms. 
First, firms’ choices were shown to be driven by risk preferences of their key stakeholders: chief 
executive officers (Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012), key managers (Koller, Lovallo, and 
Williams, 2012), or large shareholders (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2011). Second, the idea 
replaces the restrictive assumption that firms make uniform choices based on risk–neutrality. The 
uniformity would contrast with the actual heterogeneity of resolutions for the same corporate 
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challenges.
8
 Finally, concave utility functions have been repeatedly used in the literature (e.g., 
Asplund, 2002; Carceles Poveda, 2003; Choudhary and Levine, 2010; Loehman and Nelson, 
1992; Meunier 2014) to specify the tradeoff between risk and returns faced by firms. The model 
applies the prevalently used utility function with constant absolute risk aversion (Arrow, 1971): 
TV
T eVu
1)( ,  (2) 
where γ is the coefficient capturing risk aversion.
9
 That parameter has an intuitive interpretation 
that its higher value implies that the firm puts a greater discount for the risk associated with 
TV . 
Like van Binsbergen and Brandt (2007), the model specifies the state variables (i.e., the 
market returns) itC  and jtC  as a vector autoregression with one lag VAR(1). That discrete–time 
stochastic process captures linear interdependence between univariate autoregressions AR(1) 
often used to empirically capture the evolution of a random variable. Formally, 


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0
.   (3) 
Equation 3 involves the dimensions of inducements used in the literature. Thus, intercepts iA  and 
jA  capture the current return advantage iij AAA /)(  . Errors it  and jt  have variances 
2
i  and 
2
j  and correlation ρ  capturing return volatilities and correlation, respectively. With Equation 3, 
itC  and jtC  are realized in 1T  points in time ],0[ Tt . In the context void of economies of 
scope, an arbitrary realization k  of returns kitC  and kjtC  and deployment of proportions kitm  and 
                                                        
8 For example, facing the decline in the newspaper business, Belo Corporation completely withdrew from that business in 2002 to 
switch to broadcasting; while The Washington Post Co. persisted with that business. Also, facing the collapse in the snowmobile 
business in early 1970s, dozens of snowmobile businesses exited that business forever; whereas Bombardier Inc. withdrew only 
part of its resources from snowmobiles and persisted with that business until 2003. 
9 The chosen utility is common in portfolio selection (Çanakoğlu and Özekici, 2009; Henderson, 2005; Muthuraman and Kumar, 
2006). That utility has a property that )()()()(  gVufVu TT  , where   is a constant; and )(f  and )(g are functions 
independent of TV . That property enables modelers to ignore  , making complex optimization feasible. 
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)1( kitm  of resources in markets i  and j , respectively, would generate the net return at time t : 
])1([ kjtkitkitkitkt CmCmF  .   (4) 
Relatedness is modeled using its known impacts on the two types of economies of scope. 
With inter–temporal economies, relatedness reduces redeployment costs. Such costs represent a 
loss in efficiency present in withdrawing non–scale free resources from another business and 
redeploying them to a focal business relative to returns earned when the resources had been 
originally used in the focal business (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). Because the model 
captures efficiency with market returns, total costs of redeployment of resources to market j ( i ) 
at time t  are modeled as a product of (a) the marginal redeployment cost S  of a unit of 
resources; (b) the amount ],0max[ 1 kitkit mm   ]),0(max[ 1 kitkit mm  of resources redeployed to 
market j ( i ) between 1t  and t ; and (c) average returns jtCˆ  ( itCˆ ) at time t  in the recipient 
business. That specification of redeployment costs has precedents: Sakhartov and Folta (2014; 
2015) modeled redeployment costs as a proportion of returns in the receiving unit. Kogut and 
Kulatilaka (1994) also modeled switching costs as a proportion of value outcomes, although in 
their model such outcomes are captured with average production costs.
10
 Thus, with inter–
temporal economies, the net return earned by the firm at time t  is 
}ˆ],0max[ˆ],0{max[])1([ 11 jtkitkititkitkitkjtkitkitkitkt CmmCmmSCmCmF   . (5) 
With intra–temporal economies, relatedness increases the applicability of scale free 
knowledge between businesses (Bryce and Winter, 2009). Therefore, the firm can use knowledge 
from one business in another business, thereby reducing total costs (Porter, 1987; Teece, 1980) 
and increasing net returns. Small cost savings in unrelated diversification can be exceeded by the 
                                                        
10 Like in Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) and Sakhartov and Folta (2014; 2015), S does not depend on the direction of 
redeployment between i and j. The assumption captures the idea that such costs are reduced by relatedness of a pair of businesses. 
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costs of transferring the knowledge to the receiving business (Maritan and Brush, 2003), turning 
economies into diseconomies. Alternatively, large cost savings in related diversification surpass 
the costs of the knowledge transfer, creating positive economies. Those two polar scenarios for 
intra–temporal economies can be represented as a continuum amending Equation 5 as follows 
)ˆ)1(ˆ)](1(
}ˆ],0max[ˆ],0{max[])1([ 11
jtkititkit
jtkitkititkitkitkjtkitkitkitkt
CmCmI
CmmCmmSCmCmF

 

  (6) 
In Equation 6, I  is an indicator of knowledge sharing: 1I  if 10  kitm , and 0I  otherwise. 
Coefficient   is the sharing factor directly capturing the effect of relatedness on intra–temporal 
economies. When 1 , i and j are weakly related and diversification creates diseconomies. 
When 1 , i and j are moderately related and the firm generates neither economies nor 
diseconomies. When 1 , i and j are strongly related and diversification creates economies. 
The specification of relatedness in intra– temporal economies has precedents. In particular, 
Sakhartov and Folta (2014) also modeled intra–temporal economies with the sharing factor.11 
The representation of relatedness imposes no dependence structure between S  and .  
Although a strong negative relationship might be assumed because relatedness is defined as the 
general similarity of resource requirements between two businesses (Rumelt, 1974: 29), the 
model avoids assuming that strong negative relationship for several reasons. First, the extant 
theory does not argue that two businesses using similar scale free resources should necessarily 
rely on equally similar non–scale free resources. Second, by not imposing a specific structure on 
the underexplored relationship between S  and  , the model remains agnostic about the nature 
                                                        
11 There are two reasons for specifying intra–temporal economies of scope as a proportion of average rather than actual market 
returns. First, that specification precludes intra–temporal economies from being negative for reasons other than low relatedness. 
That measure is needed because, with VAR(1) itC  or jtC  (in contrast to itCˆ  or jtCˆ ) may have a negative realization. A 
negative realization may occur when the demand for the product in market i  or j  drops. That drop, however, will not eliminate 
cost savings from the knowledge sharing. Second, the specification is aligned with the specification of inter–temporal economies. 
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of that relationship. That approach enables the flexibility in examining the dynamic impact of 
relatedness on diversification for any dependence structure, instead of making the restrictive 
assumption. Finally, a later section of the current study uses industry data and introduces some 
tentative evidence of the lack of a decisively strong negative relationship between S  and  . 
The value dynamics in the context with intra–temporal and inter–temporal economies are 
shown in Table 2 for the case 10T . The first row indicates how value tV  accumulated by time 
t  evolves over time and how that value derives from the net return on investment tF . To isolate 
economies of scope from the option to buy new resources, returns are not reinvested in markets i
and j  but are put into a risk–free account with interest rate r . The second row splits the total 
value TV  accumulated over the resource lifecycle into the past (normal font) and the future (bold 
font) parts at time t . With the property of the utility described in Footnote 9, only the future part 
TV
~
 shown in the third row is relevant for the identification of diversification choices. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Identification of corporate diversification choices 
Non–trivial redeployment costs ( 0S ) make diversification path–dependent (i.e., the payoff to 
future choices depends on a current choice), precluding the analytical identification of the policy 
function (Haugh and Kogan, 2007). The intractability is resolved using the simulation–based 
technique of Brandt et al. (2005) relying on the principle of dynamic optimality (Bellman, 1957) 
and illustrated in van Binsbergen and Brandt (2007). Five steps in van Binsbergen and Brandt 
(2007) are amended with two last steps summarizing the diversification propensity. Moreover, 
the algorithm is replicated for numerous combinations of the determinants of economies of scope 
to identify how those determinants individually and jointly affect the diversification propensity. 
Economies of Scope, Resource Relatedness, and the Dynamics of Corporate Diversification 
19 
 Step 1. Simulate n  of paths for 
itC  and jtC  based on Equation 3. Discretize proportion 
]1,0[kitm  of resources deployed in i  with a grid }1,/)1(...,,/2,/1,0{ LLLLmkit  , 
where L  is a discretization number. Estimate mean returns itCˆ  and jtCˆ  for Equation 6. 
 Step 2. Take path k  and consider time 1Tt  when returns are earned the last time. 
For a current diversification choice 1Tkim  and a most recent choice 2Tkim  taken from 
their discretized values, use Equation 6 and Table 2 to estimate value kTV
~
 relevant for the 
optimization of the diversification choice 1Tkim . Repeat the estimation of kTV
~
 for each of 
n  paths. Use Equation 2 to compute utility )
~
( kTVu . Assemble the dataset consisting of n  
combinations of )
~
( kTVu , 1-kiTC , and 1-kjTC . Run an ordinary least square regression model 
such that    1-*1-5
2
14
2
131-21-10)
~
( kjTkiTkjTkiTkjTkiTkT CCCCCCVu .
12
 
 Step 3. Using the coefficients (  ’s) estimated in Step 2, compute, on each path, the 
expected utility )],,,(|)
~
([)(ˆ 2-1-1-1- kiTkiTkjTkiTkT mmCCVuEu   conditioned on the firm being 
on path k , having previously committed choice 2Tkim , and committing choice 1Tkim . 
 Step 4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 for all values of 1Tkim  and .2Tkim  Take values of )(ˆ u  
calculated for a particular value of 2Tkim  and, among them, select an optimal current 
choice )(ˆmaxarg)|(
1
1
 umm
-kiTm2-kiT
*
-kiT
 conditioned on the considered most recent choice 
2-kiTm . Repeat Step 4 for all values of the most recent diversification choice 2-kiTm . 
 Step 5. Using the dynamic programming principle, proceed recursively backward from 
2Tt  to 0t  with Steps 2, 3, and 4 and retrieve the matrix of diversification choices 
                                                        
12 The model involves the second–order Taylor expansion of the utility function. Error  is normally distributed with zero mean. 
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)|(
1-kit
*
kit
mm  on all n  paths conditioned on the most recent choices. In calculating value
kTV
~
 relevant for the optimization of diversification choices, use Equation 6 and Table 2. 
 Step 6. Given that the firm is initially focuses on market i , proceed recursively forward 
from 0t  to 1Tt  through the conditional diversification choices )|(
1-kit
*
kit
mm  
derived in Steps 5 and calculate the matrix of unconditional choices 10}{


T
t
*
kit
m . Each of n  
columns of that matrix represents the policy function on path k . All columns together 
represent the policy function for all n  states of the state variables itC  and jtC  over time. 
 Step 7. Use the matrix of unconditional choices from Step 6 and estimate the probability 
]1}0{Pr[  *kit
*
kitt mmp  of diversification at time t  by dividing the number of cases 
where the firm is not fully focused on either i  or j  at time t  by the total number of 
possible scenarios n . On each path k , the longevity of diversification kl  is counted as 
the number of periods when the firm diversifies. The mean longevity is ./ˆ
1



n
k
k nll  
RESULTS 
The analysis of the impact of relatedness on the dynamics of corporate diversification involves 
steps addressing the issues raised in Table 1. First, the diversification propensity is derived for 
various sets of the sharing factor and the marginal redeployment cost representing relatedness, 
while keeping other parameters constant. That design identifies separate and joint effects of the 
two roles of relatedness on the diversification propensity. Second, the diversification propensity 
is assessed for multiple combinations of the determinants of inter–temporal economies, when 
intra–temporal economies are disallowed. In that step, the interactions between inducements and 
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redeployment costs in determining the diversification propensity are explicated. Finally, the 
evolution of the diversification propensity is traced over time, and the sensitivity of that 
propensity to redeployment costs is checked at the end of the resource lifecycle. That analysis 
uncovers the long–run implications of relatedness with inter–temporal economies. 
Implications of relatedness for diversification propensity 
A key aim of the present study is to scrutinize the idea that relatedness unambiguously enhances 
the diversification propensity. Figure 1 illustrates the diversification propensity with two 
parameters, the probability that the firm is diversified in the middle of the resource lifecycle 
(Panel A) and the average longevity of diversification (Panel B). In each panel, inter–temporal 
economies of scope are represented with the marginal redeployment cost, varying continuously 
from its lowest possible value (i.e., the strongest relatedness) to a very high value (i.e., very weak 
relatedness). Intra–temporal economies are captured with the sharing factor, taking five discrete 
values. A very low factor (i.e., very weak relatedness) is shown with the broken lines capturing 
very strong intra–temporal diseconomies of scope. A slightly–below–medium factor is shown 
with the lines with downward–pointing triangles illustrating weak intra–temporal diseconomies. 
A moderate factor is revealed with the solid lines capturing the lack of intra–temporal economies 
or diseconomies. A slightly–above–medium factor is shown with the lines with upward–pointing 
triangles displaying weak intra–temporal economies. Finally, a very high factor (i.e., very strong 
relatedness) is demonstrated with the lines with plus signs revealing very strong intra–temporal 
economies. Three patterns summarize the effects of relatedness on the diversification propensity. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
First, Figure 1 reveals that the lines with a higher sharing factor are always located at 
least as high as the lines with a lower factor. The observed relative altitudes of the lines imply 
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that, with intra–temporal economies, relatedness monotonously enhances both the probability 
and the longevity of diversification. That first result is not novel: it confirms the existing insight 
that relatedness of scale free knowledge between businesses increases the propensity of the firm 
to diversify into those businesses. However, the magnitude of the divergence of the solid lines 
from zero in Figure 1 is surprising. The strong divergence suggests that the firm is very likely to 
persistently diversify even when relatedness of knowledge between the combined businesses is 
mediocre, generating no intra–temporal economies of scope. In particular, when intra–temporal 
economies are absent, the probability of diversification can reach the value of 99 percent and 
such diversification can last for up to 95 percent of the resource lifecycle. Because of the model 
design, in the absence of intra–temporal economies, the diversification illustrated with the solid 
lines in Figure 1 occurs due to inter–temporal economies of scope. 
Second, most of the lines in Figure 1 have inverted U–shapes. That curvature suggests 
that, with inter–temporal economies, moderate rather than the strongest relatedness leads to the 
highest probability and the greatest longevity of corporate diversification. That result challenges 
the assumed generality of the monotonous positive relationship between relatedness and the 
diversification propensity. While contrasting with the extant theory, the derived curvature can be 
intuitively explained based the dual role of relatedness with inter–temporal economies of scope. 
 With very strong relatedness, (a) the cost of the current redeployment of resources to 
another business is dispensable and (b) the decision to redeploy or not to redeploy 
resources is fully reversible. Even a tiny return advantage in another business suffices to 
make the firm redeploy all resources to that business. As a result, the firm permanently 
changes between being focused on the original business to being focused on the new 
business. Alternatively, a tiny disadvantage in another business motivates the firm to wait 
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for a better future opportunity for redeployment. In both scenarios, the firm is more likely 
to be focused rather than diversified (explaining the left parts of the curves in Figure 1). 
 With very weak relatedness, (a) the cost of the current redeployment is prohibitively high 
and (b) that redeployment would be very costly to reverse. As a result, the firm waits for 
a rare opportunity to redeploy all resources to the much better performing alternative 
business, remaining focused on the original business in the vast majority of the 
realizations of the uncertain returns (explaining the right parts of the curves in Figure 1). 
 With intermediate relatedness, both (a) the cost of the current redeployment and (b) the 
cost of reversing the redeployment or the non–redeployment decision are moderate. The 
firm envisions interchanging scenarios with advantages and disadvantages of the 
alternative business over time. The optimal decision for the value–maximizing firm in 
that case is to economize on the current redeployment cost and the possible future cost of 
reversing redeployment or non–redeployment. Accordingly, the firm rations the amount 
of redeployed resources and redeploys a portion of them to another business, the exact 
portion that will remain in that business until the end of the resources’ lifecycle. As a 
result, the firm becomes persistently diversified (explaining the peaks in Figure 1). 
Third, the lines in Figure 1 vary in concavity. Notably, the lines with moderate levels of 
the sharing factor are concave. Conversely, the lines with very low or very high factor are flat. 
With very high sharing factor on the lines with plus signs, the firm instantly redeploys part of 
resources to a new business to receive very strong intra–temporal economies. The firm then 
keeps diversifying regardless of redeployment costs. With very low sharing factor on the broken 
lines, the firm is reluctant to incur very strong diseconomies and therefore never redeploys 
resources to the new business regardless of redeployment costs. With mediocre sharing factor, 
Economies of Scope, Resource Relatedness, and the Dynamics of Corporate Diversification 
24 
the firm is indifferent to the trivial intra–temporal economies but is very sensitive to the 
magnitude of redeployment costs determining inter–temporal economies of scope. That third 
pattern in Figure 1 means that the effects relatedness has on corporate diversification with intra–
temporal and inter–temporal economies are interdependent, necessitating the empirical 
operationalization of the interdependence in models predicting corporate diversification patterns. 
Implications of inducements for diversification propensity 
Although relatedness has been a primary focus for the research on corporate diversification, the 
implications of other determinants of economies of scope (i.e., inducements) for the dynamics of 
diversification should also be explicated. That clarification would be particularly necessary if the 
effect of relatedness on the diversification propensity depended on inducements. Whether such 
interdependences are present is analyzed below for each of the dimensions of inducements. 
Current return advantage 
Figure 2 presents the implications of the current return advantage for the probability (Panel A) 
and the longevity (Panel B) of diversification. The broken lines and the lines with downward–
pointing triangles are close to the zero level indicating that, with negative current advantages, the 
diversification propensity is low and only marginally affected by redeployment costs. The result 
is intuitive: the firm is reluctant to switch resources to a substantially underperforming business 
regardless of redeployment costs. While the lowest diversification propensity corresponds to the 
strong current disadvantage, the figure fails to demonstrate a robust direct effect of the current 
advantage on corporate diversification. For example, with low redeployment costs, the strongest 
diversification propensity results from the zero current advantage. In turn, with high costs of 
redeployment, the positive current advantage leads to the strongest diversification propensity. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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Despite the unclear direct effect, the current return advantage systematically alters the 
effect of redeployment costs on the diversification propensity: with greater current advantages, a 
peak in that propensity shifts to higher redeployment costs. That shift has the following intuition. 
 Strong current advantages combined with low redeployment costs make the firm instantly 
switch all resources to another market. The effect is seen in the flat parts of the lines with 
plus signs where the firm is focused. With higher redeployment costs, the firm rations the 
amount of redeployed resources to cut current redeployment costs and possible future 
costs of reversing it. As a result, the firm switches only part of resources becoming 
diversified. The tendency occurs in the upward–sloping parts of the lines with plus signs. 
 If current return advantages are weaker, the firm is less motivated to redeploy all 
resources to another business and the rationing of the amount of redeployed resources 
(i.e., partial redeployment leading to diversification) starts with lower redeployment 
costs, as in the lines with upward–pointed triangles and the solid lines in Figure 2. 
Return volatility 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of return volatility on the diversification propensity. Volatility 
affects the diversification propensity in two ways. First, with particular redeployment costs, the 
lines with higher volatility often appear above the lines with lower volatility, implying a direct 
positive effect on the diversification propensity. That effect corresponds to the insight of the 
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959) suggesting that the greater variance of more–volatile returns 
creates a stronger motivation for a risk–averse agent to diversify the associated risks. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Second, the arms of a line in Figure 3 are further apart from each other, the higher is 
volatility associated with that line. That second pattern, unenlightened by the portfolio theory, is 
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unique to inter–temporal economies of scope. The pattern suggests that return volatility can 
significantly extend values of relatedness in inter–temporal economies with which diversification 
is highly likely. In particular, the range of redeployment costs resulting in the probability of 
diversification greater than 75 percent is six times broader with very high volatility than with low 
volatility. The effect, also present in the longevity of diversification, can be explained as follows. 
The firm faces the oscillation of relative returns in another business between advantages 
and disadvantages, with the magnitude of the realized differences depending on return volatility. 
 With low volatility, confidence bands for returns are narrow and return advantages and 
disadvantages are weak in most scenarios. The loss from not having redeployed resources 
would be relatively low; whereas, in redeployment, the firm would have to instantly pay 
some cost. In that case, very low redeployment costs (below even a weak advantage) 
make the firm redeploy all resources to another business. However, even moderate costs 
of redeployment would exceed a weak advantage in another business and discourage the 
firm from the initial redeployment, explaining why the downward–sloping increments of 
the lines with low volatility are positioned quite close to the left margins in Figure3. 
 With high volatility, confidence bands for returns are broad and both strong advantages 
and strong disadvantages are abundant. In that case, the firm decides between (a) 
instantly redeploying resources to the currently much–better–performing business, but 
likely facing the need to costly redeploy resources back in the future; and (b) waiting for 
even greater advantages in another business, but possibly losing the greatest advantage. 
Facing that dilemma, the firm maximizing total inter–temporal economies cautiously 
accepts higher redeployment costs and redeploys part of resources, explaining the shift of 
the downward–sloping increments of the lines to higher redeployment costs. 
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Return correlation 
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of return correlation on the diversification propensity. That 
propensity bears upon correlation in two ways. First, with particular redeployment costs, lines 
with more–negative correlation appear above lines with more–positive correlation, revealing a 
direct negative effect on the diversification propensity. That effect is aligned with the portfolio 
theory (Markowitz, 1959) in that that more–positive return correlation leads to a greater variance 
of returns (i.e., the risk) of a portfolio of assets, reducing the utility of diversification. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Second, the arms of a line in Figure 4 are more distant from each other, the more–
negative is correlation on that line. Unexplored by the portfolio theory, that effect is an attribute 
of inter–temporal economies of scope. The effect suggests that correlation significantly contains 
values of relatedness in inter–temporal economies, with which corporate diversification is likely. 
Thus, the range of redeployment costs resulting in the probability of diversification greater than 
75 percent is three times broader with strong negative correlation than with zero correlation. The 
extension, also revealed in the longevity of diversification, has the following intuition. 
 With positive correlation, market returns are close to each other and scenarios with strong 
advantages or disadvantages are rare. In that case, moderate costs suffice to discourage 
the firm from initial redeployment making the firm focus in most scenarios. That is why 
the lines with weak positive correlation decline close to the left margins in Figure 4. 
 With negative correlation, market returns diverge from each other and strong advantages 
and disadvantages are present. In that case, the firm faces the same dilemma as with high 
volatility. Maximizing total inter–temporal economies, the firm accepts higher costs and 
switches part of resources, shifting the declining increments to the right. 
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To sum up, inducements alter how relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies 
affects the diversification propensity. Notably, the peak in such a propensity shifts to higher 
redeployment costs when another business currently more–strongly outperforms the existing 
business. The effect extends on a broader range of redeployment costs when the businesses have 
more–volatile returns. The effect extends on a broader range of redeployment costs when the 
businesses have more–negatively correlated returns. Accordingly, the effect of relatedness on 
diversification cannot be reliably identified unless its interactions with inducements are captured. 
Evolution of diversification propensity with different types of economies of scope 
The last candidate for the scrutiny of the effect of relatedness on diversification is the claim that, 
unlike intra–temporal economies, inter–temporal economies from redeploying non–scale free 
resources between related businesses has only short–run implications (Bryce and Winter, 2009: 
1573). The model can test that claim by separately tuning relatedness involved in intra–temporal 
and inter–temporal economies of scope and tracing the probability of diversification over time. 
Figure 5 reveals the long–run implications of relatedness. Panel A presents the effect of 
redeployment costs on the likelihood of diversification at the end of the resource lifecycle. Intra–
temporal economies are disallowed. Relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies strongly 
affects the probability of diversification even at the end of the lifecycle. In particular, the 
inverted U–shape relationship robustly confirmed in Figures 1–4 persists by the end of the 
lifecycle. Moreover, the magnitude of the relation continues to be very strong: the probability of 
diversification varies between zero and 99 percent depending on the value of redeployment costs. 
Insert Figure 5 here 
Panel B of Figure 5 depicts the dynamics of the probability of diversification when 
relatedness present in inter–temporal economies assumes a mediocre value. Three scenarios for 
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intra–temporal economies are modeled: (a) economies are strong (the line with plus signs), (b) 
neither economies nor diseconomies are present (the solid line), and (c) diseconomies are strong 
(the broken line). The striking difference in the elevation between the line with plus signs and the 
broken line confirms that relatedness of scale free resources between businesses has a strong and 
long–lasting positive effect on diversification into those businesses (Bryce and Winter, 2009: 
1573). However, the dynamics illustrated with the solid line, representing the context void of 
intra–temporal economies, contrast with the existing conception that inter–temporal economies 
of scope may only have a short–run effect on corporate diversification. In the absence of intra–
temporal economies, moderate relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies makes the 
probability of diversification grow over time and then keeps it very high (96%) in the long run. 
Validation of results 
A substantial effort has been put to verify that the model is adequate to corporate settings. First, 
the model uses concepts often applied in corporate diversification research. Second, in capturing 
those concepts, the model builds off the modelling precedents. Third, the model reconfirms the 
main idea of the extant theory and only qualifies it by considering the previously ignored issues. 
Fourth, every new result is given an intuitive interpretation. Fifth, multiple robustness tests were 
run to check whether the results are due to the particular specification. As common in sensitivity 
analyses of simulation models, results in each figure were re–estimated for alternative values of 
parameters held constant in the baseline estimation. The directions of all the results have been 
reconfirmed.
13
 Finally, the later section compares the most intriguing result of the inverted U–
shape relationship with the patterns of corporate diversification observed in the U.S. industries. 
                                                        
13 In addition, returns were modeled as geometric Brownian or mean–reverting processes. Also, the non–negativity constraint on 
the accumulated value was established. Finally, total redeployment costs were modeled as a fixed value. Results of the robustness 
checks are available upon request. 
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Summary of new theoretical results 
The following hypotheses summarize the new theoretical results amending the existing theory. 
H1: The propensity to diversify in two businesses has an inverted U–shape relationship with 
relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies of scope between those businesses. 
H2: The inverted U–shape relationship between the propensity to diversify in two businesses 
and relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies of scope is strongest when relatedness 
involved in intra–temporal economies of scope is moderate. 
H3: The inverted U–shape relationship between the propensity to diversify in two businesses 
and relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies of scope sifts to lower levels of such 
relatedness with stronger current return advantages. 
H4: The inverted U–shape relationship between the propensity to diversify in two businesses 
and relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies of scope expands onto a broader range 
for such relatedness with higher return volatilities. 
H5: The inverted U–shape relationship between the propensity to diversify in two businesses 
and relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies of scope expands onto a broader range 
for such relatedness with more–negative return correlation. 
TOWARDS EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION OF THEORETICAL RESULTS 
Empirical models seeking to test the implications of relatedness for the dynamics of corporate 
diversification, elaborated with Hypotheses 1–5, can take the following form: 




2
1312
2
1110
2
98
2
765
22
43210 )]([)(
ijijijijjjijii
itjtijitjtijijijij
SSS
CCSCCSSKY
. (7) 
The dependent variable Y  may be captured as the probability of the co–occurrence of businesses 
i  and j  in the corporate scope or the duration of that combination. Businesses can be identified 
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based on the U.S. SIC. All  ’s are estimated coefficients. By K , a vector of determinants of the 
diversification propensity other than those used in this study is denoted. The sharing factor ij  
can be measured with the Euclidean distance between patent profiles of SIC industries created by 
Brian Silverman. That measure (detailed in the Appendix) inversely captures the similarity of the 
scale free technological knowledge between industries. Redeployment costs ijS  can be measured 
as the Euclidian distance between industries i  and j  in non–scale free resources (detailed in the 
Appendix). Current returns itC  and jtC  can be taken from the Compustat Segments as mean 
industry return on asset (ROA) at time t . Volatilities i  and j  can be computed as standard 
deviations of industry ROA. Return correlation ij  can be measured as correlation of mean ROA 
between industries. Finally, the distribution of the error term   is chosen based on the used 
dependent variable, the probability of the co–occurrence or the duration of the co–occurrence. 
Hypotheses H1–H5 are tested by checking the signs of the respective  ’s. Based on the 
theoretical results derived in the present study, the expected signs of the coefficients are the 
following: 04   (H2), 06   (H1), 07   (H3), 09   and 011   (H4), and 013   (H5). 
DISCUSSION 
Does relatedness between businesses enhance the tendency for a diversifying firm to persistently 
combine them? The existing theory answered that question affirmatively (Bryce and Winter, 
2009; Lien and Klein, 2013; Teece et al., 1994). The direct relationship, inferred from the 
positive impact of relatedness on intra–temporal economies of scope from knowledge sharing, 
has been tested empirically (Breschi et al., 2003; Fan and Lang, 2000; Lemelin, 1982). However, 
there has also been recognition of inter–temporal economies of scope, with which relatedness 
Economies of Scope, Resource Relatedness, and the Dynamics of Corporate Diversification 
32 
can destabilize the corporate scope making firms exit some businesses to enter related businesses 
(Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Lee et al. 2010; Penrose, 1959; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014). With 
that insight, the ultimate effect of relatedness on the dynamics of diversification is less certain 
than previously believed. In addition, determinants of economies of scope other than relatedness 
were argued to interact with relatedness in creating economies (Penrose, 1959; Sakhartov and 
Folta, 2015) and therefore can alter the effect of relatedness on the diversification propensity. To 
improve the understanding of the effect of relatedness on the dynamics of diversification, this 
study builds the dynamic model of diversification choices including both types of economies of 
scope. The model delivers several stimulating insights for the corporate diversification research. 
First, the model identifies separate and joint effects of relatedness on the diversification 
propensity with the two types of economies of scope. As known before, that propensity is 
enhanced by relatedness of scale free knowledge involved in intra–temporal economies. In 
contrast, with inter–temporal economies, the diversification propensity has an inverted U–shape 
relationship with relatedness. That means that firms are most likely to persist with pairs of 
businesses having intermediate rather than the highest relatedness of non–scale free resources. 
Moreover, the two effects of relatedness are interdependent. In particular, the diversification 
propensity is most sensitive to relatedness present in inter–temporal economies when relatedness 
involved in intra–temporal economies is moderate. The difference between the two effects of 
relatedness on corporate diversification, along with the interdependence between those effects, 
necessitates the separate operationalizations of the two manifestations of relatedness and the re–
examination of the often–tested relationship between diversification and relatedness. 
Second, relatedness alone does not suffice to predict the proclivity of a firm to diversify. 
Inducements significantly moderate the effect of relatedness. The derived interactions suggest 
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that the effect of relatedness on diversification cannot be empirically identified, unless its 
interactions with inducements are captured. The study summarizes the empirical relationships 
and provides the direction for their empirical operationalization, laying the groundwork for a 
better empirical identification of the determinants of the diversification propensity. 
Finally, the paper uncovers the dynamics of diversification based on inter–temporal 
economies involving non–scale free resources. In contrast to the extant view, the diversification 
propensity remains very sensitive to relatedness of non–scale free resources in the long run. With 
moderate relatedness present in inter–temporal economies, the firm diversifies, even when intra–
temporal economies from sharing scale free knowledge are absent. Moreover, such propensity 
grows rather than declines over time. Beyond revising the idea that relatedness of non–scale free 
resources may only have short–run effect on diversification (Bryce and Winter, 2009), the result 
warns about the limitations of the recently advocated measure of relatedness based on survival of 
business combinations (Bryce and Winter, 2009; Lien and Klein, 2013; Teece et al., 1994). The 
risk of inferring relatedness from the survival of business combinations is illustrated below. 
Relationship between diversification propensity and relatedness in U.S. industries 
This section provides some tentative evidence of the relation between the proclivity of U.S. firms 
to diversify and the two effects of relatedness. The diversification propensity is computed as the 
mean time of combining two U.S. SIC industries within a firm’s scope based on the Compustat 
Segments in years 1976–2013. The sharing factor, representing intra–temporal economies, is 
estimated using patent profiles of U.S. SIC industries. That operationalization (described in the 
Appendix) captures the similarity between industries in scale free technological knowledge 
classified into categories (e.g., Explosives; Basic Electric Elements; and Optics). Redeployment 
costs, capturing un–relatedness in inter–temporal economies, are computed using profiles of U.S. 
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SIC industries in tangible resources. The measure (detailed in the Appendix) considers the 
dissimilarity between industries in non–scale free resources classified into categories of tangible 
resources in Compustat (e.g., Inventories; Property, Plant, and Equipment; Cash and Short–term 
Investments). The relationship between the two proxies for relatedness is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Insert Figure 6 here 
The distribution of the data points in Figure 6 indicates that different combinations of the 
two effects of relatedness are present in U.S. industries. The declining regression line displays a 
negative relation between the sharing factor and redeployment costs. That relation was expected 
because relatedness makes general resource requirements in two industries similar, facilitating 
both knowledge sharing and resource redeployment. Although the revealed relation is significant 
statistically (p–value<0.001), its magnitude is weak. The weakness of the relation between the 
two effects of relatedness implies that two businesses using similar scale free knowledge do not 
necessarily rely on equally similar non–scale free resources. The revealed weak relation also 
suggests that the two manifestations of relatedness can be disentangled empirically. 
Figure 7 shows the time of combining industries against the two effects of relatedness 
between them. If the believed simple relationship where relatedness enhances the diversification 
propensity were true, the graph would have one peak (Panel A). With actual data (Panel B), there 
is indeed a peak in the top left corner revealing the persistence of pairs of strongly related 
businesses. However, there is another peak where the two proxies are moderate. Accordingly, the 
long survival of pairs of moderately related businesses, advocated as the measure of relatedness, 
may be erroneously classified as revealing strong relatedness. The second peak with mediocre 
sharing factors and redeployment costs matches the peak in the solid line in Panel B of Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 7 here 
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Limitations 
The present study builds the dynamic model of diversification choices to improve the 
understanding of how the dynamics of corporate diversification bear upon resource relatedness. 
Nevertheless, the used methodology has some intrinsic limitations. The generalizability of the 
results derived numerically may be compromised by arbitrary choices of the model’s parameters. 
The current study, like other studies using simulation, attempts to mitigate the concern about the 
generalizability by undertaking extensive sensitivity checks and confirming that the directions of 
all the reported relationships are robust in a wide variety of parameter specifications. 
 In addition, the practical significance of the theoretically derived relationships depends 
on their strength relative to other predictors of the diversification propensity in real corporate 
contexts. Although the previous section reports the tentative evidence from the real industry 
setting consistent with the main derived result, the illustration falls short of controlling for 
multiple alternative predictors of the diversification propensity. Future empirical work should 
use more sophisticated empirical models to ascertain whether the reported effects of relatedness 
on the proclivity of firms to diversify are statistically significant in representative samples. 
Some readers may find the used model of diversification too simplistic because it ignores 
time lags in resource allocation, organizational inertia, bounded rationality of corporate 
managers, competitive advantages of incumbent or new firms in entered businesses, and possible 
acquisitions and divestitures of resources. While adding those features would enrich the enquiry, 
they would also considerably complicate the model making it intractable even numerically. 
Future research might try building more comprehensive models of corporate diversification. 
Finally, the focus on economies of scope confronts the tenet that corporate diversification 
is redundant because stock market investors can, by themselves, diversify their investment 
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portfolios. While general inapplicability of that tenet to corporate strategy has been already 
explained (Conundrum #1 in Bettis, 1983); the present study considers how active managerial 
strategies can extract value unavailable to undiversified firms and, accordingly, their investors. 
Conclusion 
The present paper scrutinizes the implications of resource relatedness for the dynamics of 
corporate diversification. The benchmark for the scrutiny is the very prevalent belief that firms 
are more likely to diversify in combinations of more–related businesses, because relatedness 
enhances intra–temporal economies of scope from contemporaneously sharing scale free 
knowledge between combined businesses. The study uses the dynamic model of diversification 
choices to reconsider that proposition. The model follows recent research and involves the 
effects relatedness has on the diversification propensity with various types of economies of 
scope. The model demonstrates that, with inter–temporal economies from redeployment of non–
scale free resources, the effect of relatedness on the diversification propensity remarkably differs 
from what is commonly assumed. In particular, with inter–temporal economies, moderate rather 
than the strongest relatedness leads to the strongest diversification propensity. Moreover, the 
effect of relatedness involved in inter–temporal economies on the diversification propensity is 
critically moderated by other determinants of inter–temporal economies of scope and by 
relatedness involved in intra–temporal economies. The study develops empirically testable 
hypotheses for those complex relationships importantly qualifying the commonly tested, simple 
proposition that firms are more likely to diversify in more–related businesses. The paper also 
suggests empirical operationalizations for the developed hypotheses. Those developments can 
encourage empiricists to retest the dynamic implications of relatedness for corporate 
diversification.
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APPENDIX: Operationalizations of resource relatedness with U.S. industry data 
The sharing factor, representing relatedness in intra–temporal economies, is estimated using 
patent profiles of 3–digit U.S. SIC industries compiled by Brian Silverman. The measure 
assumes that sharing technological (scale free) knowledge is easier between industries with 
more–similar knowledge requirements. Accordingly, knowledge dissimilarity between industries 
i and j is quantified as an Euclidean distance:  
a
jaia
P
ij PPS
2)( , where )( jaia PP  is the 
frequency of patents from category a being used in industry i(j). To directly capture the ease of 
the knowledge sharing, the distance is then subtracted from its highest possible value and scaled 
by that value. The mean (median) of the final measure of the sharing factor is 54% (57%).
14 
Redeployment costs, representing relatedness in inter–temporal economies, are estimated 
with industry profiles of tangible assets as follows. Balance sheet data are taken from Compustat 
for firms present in 1989–1996. Then, intangibles are eliminated. A firm’s industry is defined as 
the main 3–digit SIC code. Finally, for industry i , the value of assets of category b  is summed 
up, and its weight ibQ  in the total asset value in i  is computed. Because redeploying resources is 
harder between industries with less–similar requirements, redeployment costs between industries 
i and j are estimated as an Euclidean distance:  
b
jbib
Q
ij QQS
2)( . The distance is then scaled 
by its highest possible value. The mean (median) of the measure is 30% (27%).
15
 
                                                        
14 While the measure of patent similarity was developed by Silverman (1999) to enhance the researchers’ ability to effectively 
capture relatedness between two industries in terms of the knowledge involved, the measure has the following limitations. First, 
the measure is restricted to only one type of scale free resources, patented knowledge. There are other scale free resources (e.g., 
reputation and brand names), not included in the measure. Second, the database involves patents granted in 1990–1993. The 
contemporary patent structure may have changed since then. 
15 The offered measure of the cost of redeploying non–scale free resources has the following limitations. First, the SIC code used 
to compile an industry profile in terms of tangible resources is the main SIC code reported by firms in Compustat. That code 
pertains to single–business and multi–business firms. There are not enough single–business firms in the database to develop the 
measure across all pairs of industries. Second, there is a reservation in the description of the Compustat variable Intangible Assets 
that some intangibles may be captured by Property, Plant, and Equipment, when no breakdown for such assets is available. 
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A. Effects of redeployment costs and the sharing factor 
on the probability of corporate diversification
 
B. Effects of redeployment costs and the sharing factor 
on the longevity of corporate diversification 
Figure 1. Implications of relatedness for the dynamics of corporate diversification
 
Figure 1 shows the probability tp  of the firm being diversified in markets i  and j  in the middle of the resources lifecycle (Panel A), and the average longevity 
lˆ  of such diversification (Panel B). In both panels, the first (inverse) proxy for relatedness, the marginal redeployment cost S , represents inter–temporal 
economies of scope and varies within the interval ]3.1,0.0[S . In particular, 0.0S  corresponds to the strongest possible relatedness between i  and j  in 
non–scale free resources, whereas 3.1S  corresponds to very weak relatedness. In both panels, the second (direct) proxy for relatedness, the sharing factor  , 
represents intra–temporal economies of scope and takes five values }0.1,01.1,00.1,99.0,90.0{ . To clarify, with 90.0  (depicted with the broken lines), 
i  and j  are very weakly related in scale free knowledge, resulting in strong intra–temporal diseconomies of scope. With 99.0  (depicted with the lines with 
downward–pointing triangles), knowledge relatedness is slightly below average, resulting in weak diseconomies. With 00.1  (depicted with the solid lines), 
knowledge relatedness is average, generating neither diseconomies nor economies. With 01.1  (depicted with the lines with upward–pointing triangles), 
knowledge relatedness is slightly above average, creating weak economies. With 10.1  (depicted with the lines with plus signs), i  and j  are very strongly 
related in knowledge, resulting in strong economies. The following values of other parameters were used to generate the graphs: the length of the resource 
lifecycle, 10T ; the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 5.0 ; the discreteness with which resource capacity may be redeployed, 10L ; the offsets 
capturing the current returns, 50.0 ji AA ; the trends for returns, 1.0 jjii  ; the variances of the innovation terms capturing the volatilities of returns, 
45.0
22
 ji  ; the correlation of the innovation terms capturing the correlation of returns, 0 ; the number of simulated paths for the returns, 000,10n ; 
the risk–free interest rate, 1.0r ; and the value of the invested resources, 10 V .
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A. Effects of redeployment costs and the current return 
advantage on the probability of diversification
 
B. Effects of redeployment costs and the current return 
advantage on the longevity of diversification 
Figure 2. Implications of redeployment costs and the current return advantage for the dynamics of corporate diversification
 
Figure 2 shows the probability tp  of the firm being diversified in markets i  and j  in the middle of the resources lifecycle (Panel A), and the average longevity 
lˆ  of such diversification (Panel B). In both panels, the first (inverse) proxy for relatedness, the marginal redeployment cost S , represents inter–temporal 
economies of scope and varies within the interval ]3.1,0.0[S . In particular, 0.0S  corresponds to the strongest possible relatedness between i  and j  in 
non–scale free resources, whereas 3.1S  corresponds to very weak relatedness. In both panels, the second proxy for relatedness, the sharing factor  , is set to 
the medium value 00.1  with which knowledge relatedness is mediocre and intra–temporal diseconomies or economies are absent. In both panels, the current 
return advantage iij AAA /)(   takes five values. In particular, in the broken lines, 50.0iA and 40.0jA  showing the strong negative current advantage. In 
the lines with downward–pointing triangles, 50.0iA  and 45.0jA  revealing the weak negative current return advantage. In the solid lines, 50.0 ji AA  
capturing the zero current advantage. In the lines with upward–pointing triangles, 50.0iA and 55.0jA  showing the weak positive current advantage. In the 
lines with plus signs, 50.0iA  and 60.0jA  revealing the strong positive current advantage. The following values of other parameters were used to create the 
graphs: the length of the resource lifecycle, 10T ; the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 5.0 ; the discreteness with which resource capacity may be 
redeployed, 10L ; the trends for returns, 1.0 jjii  ; the variances of the innovation terms showing return volatilities, 45.0
22
 ji  ; the correlation of 
the innovation terms capturing return correlation, 0 ; the number of simulated paths for the returns, 000,10n ; the risk–free interest rate, 1.0r ; and the 
value of the invested resources, 10 V .
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A. Effects of redeployment costs and return volatility 
on the probability of corporate diversification
 
B. Effects of redeployment costs and return volatility 
on the longevity of corporate diversification 
Figure 3. Implications of redeployment costs and return volatility for the dynamics of corporate diversification
 
Figure 3 shows the probability tp  of the firm being diversified in markets i  and j  in the middle of the resources lifecycle (Panel A), and the average longevity 
lˆ  of such diversification (Panel B). In both panels, the first (inverse) proxy for relatedness, the marginal redeployment cost S , represents inter–temporal 
economies of scope and varies within the interval ]3.1,0.0[S . In particular, 0.0S  corresponds to the strongest possible relatedness between i  and j  in 
non–scale free resources, whereas 3.1S  corresponds to very weak relatedness. In both panels, the second proxy for relatedness, the sharing factor  , is set to 
the medium value 00.1  with which knowledge relatedness is mediocre and intra–temporal diseconomies or economies are absent. In both panels, the 
variances 
2
i
  and
2
j  of the innovation terms capturing the volatilities of returns take five values. In particular, in the broken lines, 05.0
22
 ji   capturing 
very low volatility. In the lines with downward–pointing triangles, 30.0
22
 ji   revealing low volatility. In the solid lines, 45.0
22
 ji   corresponding to 
moderate volatility. In the lines with upward–pointing triangles, 80.0
22
 ji   corresponding to high volatility. In the lines marked with plus signs, 
05.1
22
 ji   corresponding to very high volatility. The following values of other parameters were used to generate the graphs: the length of the resource 
lifecycle, 10T ; the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 5.0 ; the discreteness with which resource capacity may be redeployed, 10L ; the offsets 
capturing the initial returns, 50.0 ji AA ; the trends for returns, 1.0 jjii  ; the correlation of the innovation terms capturing return correlation, 0 ; 
the number of simulated paths for the returns, 000,10n ; the risk–free interest rate, 1.0r ; and the value of the invested resources, 10 V .
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A. Effects of redeployment costs and return correlation 
on the probability of corporate diversification
 
B. Effects of redeployment costs and return correlation 
on the longevity of corporate diversification 
Figure 4. Implications of redeployment costs and return correlation for the dynamics of corporate diversification
 
Figure 4 shows the probability tp  of the firm being diversified in markets i  and j  in the middle of the resources lifecycle (Panel A), and the average longevity 
lˆ  of such diversification (Panel B). In both panels, the first (inverse) proxy for relatedness, the marginal redeployment cost S , represents inter–temporal 
economies of scope and varies within the interval ]3.1,0.0[S . In particular, 0.0S  corresponds to the strongest possible relatedness between i  and j  in 
non–scale free resources, whereas 3.1S  corresponds to very weak relatedness. In both panels, the second proxy for relatedness, the sharing factor  , is set to 
the medium value 00.1  with which knowledge relatedness is mediocre and intra–temporal diseconomies or economies are absent. In both panels, the 
correlation  of the innovation terms capturing return correlation takes five values. In particular, in the broken lines, 99.0  representing strong negative 
correlation. In the lines with downward–pointing triangles, 50.0  revealing weak negative correlation. In the solid lines, 00.0  representing zero 
correlation. In the lines with upward–pointing triangles, 50.0  showing weak positive correlation. In the lines with plus signs, 99.0  capturing strong 
positive correlation. The following values of other parameters were used to generate the graphs: the length of the resource lifecycle, 10T ; the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion, 5.0 ; the discreteness with which resource capacity may be redeployed, 10L ; the offsets capturing the initial returns, 
50.0 ji AA ; the trends for returns, 1.0 jjii  ; the variances of the innovation terms capturing the volatilities of returns, 45.0
22
 ji  ; the number of 
simulated paths for the returns, 000,10n ; the risk–free interest rate, 1.0r ; and the value of the invested resources, 10 V .
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A. Long–run effect of redeployment costs on the 
probability of corporate diversification
 
B. Evolution of the probability of corporate 
diversification over time 
Figure 5. Long–run implications of relatedness for the dynamics of corporate diversification
 
Panel A of Figure 5 shows the probability Tp  of the firm being diversified in markets i  and j  in the end of the resources lifecycle. In Panel A, the first 
(inverse) proxy for relatedness, the marginal redeployment cost S , represents inter–temporal economies of scope and varies within the interval ]3.1,0.0[S . In 
particular, 0.0S  corresponds to the strongest possible relatedness between i  and j  in non–scale free resources, whereas 3.1S  corresponds to very weak 
relatedness. In Panel A, the second proxy for relatedness, the sharing factor  , is set to the medium value 00.1  with which knowledge relatedness is 
mediocre and intra–temporal diseconomies or economies are absent. Panel B of Figure 5 shows the evolution of the probability tp  of the firm being diversified 
in markets i  and j  over the resources lifecycle. In Panel B, the marginal redeployment cost takes an intermediate value 195.0S  representing moderate 
relatedness of non–scale free resources involved in inter–temporal economies. The sharing factor   in Panel B takes three values. In particular, with 90.0  
(depicted with the broken line), i  and j  are very weakly related in knowledge, resulting in strong intra–temporal diseconomies of scope. With 00.1  
(depicted with the solid line), knowledge relatedness is average, generating neither diseconomies nor economies. With 10.1  (depicted with the line with plus 
signs), i  and j  are very strongly related in knowledge, resulting in strong economies. In both panels, the following values of other parameters were used: the 
length of the resource lifecycle, 10T ; the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 5.0 ; the discreteness with which resource capacity may be redeployed, 
10L ; the offsets capturing the initial returns, 50.0 ji AA ; the trends for returns, 1.0 jjii  ; the variances of the innovation terms capturing the 
volatilities of returns, 45.0
22
 ji  ; the correlation of the innovation terms capturing return correlation, 0 ; the number of simulated paths for the returns, 
000,10n ; the risk–free interest rate, 1.0r ; and the value of invested resources, 10 V .
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Figure 6. Relationship between two manifestations of relatedness in U.S. industries 
Figure 6 presents the scatterplot for the joint distribution of the two ramifications of relatedness, the sharing factor 
and redeployment costs, across the U.S. industries. The sharing factor, representing relatedness in intra–temporal 
economies, is estimated using patent profiles of 3–digit U.S. SIC industries. That operationalization captures the 
similarity, between any two industries, in scale free technological knowledge classified into patent categories. 
Redeployment costs, capturing un–relatedness in inter–temporal economies, are represented using profiles of 3–digit 
U.S. SIC industries in terms of tangible resources. That operationalization measures the dissimilarity, between any 
two industries, in non–scale free resources classified into categories of tangible resources in Compustat balance 
sheet statements.
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A. Assumed diversification propensity versus sharing 
factor and redeployment cost
 
B. Actual diversification propensity versus sharing 
factor and redeployment cost 
Figure 7. Diversification propensity in U.S. industries
 
Figure 7 presents filled contour maps showing the average time of combining different pairs of U.S. SIC industries against the two ramifications of relatedness. 
Panel A arbitrarily illustrates the previously assumed simple relationship, with which relatedness unambiguously enhances the diversification propensity. Panel B 
demonstrates the actual relationship occurring in the real U.S. industry data. The diversification propensity is computed as the average time of combining a pair 
of 3–digit U.S. SIC industries within a firm’s scope based on the Compustat Segments data in years from 1976 to 2013. The sharing factor, representing 
relatedness in intra–temporal economies, is estimated using patent profiles of 3–digit U.S. SIC industries. That operationalization captures the similarity, between 
any two industries, in scale free technological knowledge classified into patent categories. Redeployment costs, capturing un–relatedness in inter–temporal 
economies, are represented using profiles of 3–digit U.S. SIC industries in terms of tangible resources. That operationalization measures the dissimilarity, 
between any two industries, in non–scale free resources classified into categories of tangible resources in Compustat balance sheet statements.
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Table 1. Previous and novel insights into the implications of relatedness for the dynamics of corporate diversification 
Questions on dynamics of 
corporate diversification 
Limiting approaches 
in extant research 
Specific implication in previous 
research 
Novel results 
How does relatedness 
affect the propensity of a 
firm to diversify? 
Limited recognition of 
different types of 
economies of scope 
Relatedness monotonously 
enhances the probability of 
corporate diversification. 
The monotonous positive effect of 
relatedness on the probability of 
corporate diversification does not 
hold with inter–temporal economies 
of scope, wherein the probability of 
diversification has an inverted U–
shape relationship with relatedness. 
Does the restrictive focus 
on relatedness suffice to 
predict the proclivity of a 
firm to diversify? 
Limited attention to 
determinants of 
economies of scope 
other than relatedness 
The effect of relatedness on the 
propensity of a firm to diversify is 
unconditional (i.e., that effect does 
not depend on other determinants of 
economies of scope). 
The effect of relatedness on the 
propensity of a firm to diversify 
strongly interacts with inducements. 
How does the propensity of 
a firm to diversify evolve 
over time? 
Verbal theorizing in the 
complex context with 
inter–temporal linkages 
between corporate 
diversification 
decisions 
In the long run, the probability of 
diversification is affected by 
relatedness linked to intra–temporal 
economies of scope but unaffected 
by relatedness linked to inter–
temporal economies of scope. 
In the long run, the probability of 
diversification is very sensitive to 
relatedness present in inter–temporal 
economies. Moreover, with 
moderate levels of relatedness 
involved in inter–temporal 
economies of scope, the probability 
of diversification due to such 
economies remains very high by the 
end of the resource lifecycle. 
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Table 2. Value dynamics over resources lifecycle 
 
Time t t =0 t =1 t =2 t =3 t =4 t =5 t =6 t =7 t =8 t =9 t =T =10
Value V kt 
accumulated by 
time t
V k 0 V k 0+V k 0F k 1 V k 0+                   
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 1+ 
V k 0F k 2
V k 0+                     
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 2+                  
V k 0F 3
V k 0+                    
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 3+ 
V k 0F k 4
V k 0+                   
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 4+ 
V k 0F k 5
V k 0+                   
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 5+ 
V k 0F k 6
V k 0+                    
[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
V k 0F k 7
V k 0+                       
[(1+r )
7
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
V k 0F k 8
V k 0+                       
[(1+r )
8
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
7
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
V k 0F k 9
V k 0+                       
[(1+r )
9
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
8
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
7
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 9+ 
V k 0F k 10
Value V kT  as 
seen from time t
V k 0+                       
[(1+r )
9
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
8
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
7
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
6
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[(1+r )
5
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4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
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3
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1
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2
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8
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7
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[(1+r )
6
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[(1+r )
5
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[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 9+ 
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[(1+r )
7
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[(1+r )
6
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[(1+r )
5
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[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
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1
-1]V k 0F k 9+ 
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[(1+r )
7
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[(1+r )
6
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[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 9+ 
V k 0F k 10
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[(1+r )
9
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[(1+r )
9
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[(1+r )
8
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[(1+r )
7
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
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[(1+r )
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-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
[(1+r )
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9
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V k 0F k 10
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[(1+r )
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[(1+r )
5
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[(1+r )
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-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
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[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 9+ 
V k 0F k 10
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[(1+r )
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-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
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[(1+r )
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[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
5
-1]V k 0F k 5+          
[(1+r )
4
-1]V k 0F k 6+ 
[(1+r )
3
-1]V k 0F k 7+  
[(1+r )
2
-1]V k 0F k 8+ 
[(1+r )
1
-1]V k 0F k 9+ 
V k 0F k 10
Value Ṽ kT  
relevant for 
maximization of 
V kT  at time t
[(1+r )
9
-1]V k 0F k 1+     
[(1+r )
8
-1]V k 0F k 2+           
[(1+r )
7
-1]V k 0F k 3+          
[(1+r )
6
-1]V k 0F k 4+            
[(1+r )
5
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[(1+r )
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[(1+r )
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